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Open access under CC Perceptual load is a key determinant of distraction by task-irrelevant stimuli (e.g., Lavie, N.
(2005). Distracted and confused?: Selective attention under load. Trends in Cognitive Sci-
ences, 9, 75–82). Here we establish the role of perceptual load in determining an internal
form of distraction by task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs or ‘‘mind-wandering”).
Four experiments demonstrated reduced frequency of TUTs with high compared to low
perceptual load in a visual-search task. Alternative accounts in terms of increased demands
on responses, verbal working memory or motivation were ruled out and clear effects of
load were found for unintentional TUTs. Individual differences in load effects on internal
(TUTs) and external (response-competition) distractors were correlated. These results sug-
gest that exhausting attentional capacity in task-relevant processing under high perceptual
load can reduce processing of task-irrelevant information from external and internal
sources alike.
 2009 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
A main goal of attention research is to understand the
determinants of successful focused attention that allows
for minimal distraction by goal-irrelevant information.
This fundamental issue has stimulated much research over
the past four decades (e.g., see Kahneman and Treisman
(1984), Lavie and Tsal (1994), Lavie (1995) for reviews)
and a major determinant of focused attention that has
been highlighted is the level of perceptual load in a task.
The role of perceptual load in attention has been eluci-
dated within the perceptual load theory (Lavie, 1995; Lavie
& Tsal, 1994), which suggests that distractor processing
critically depends on the availability of attentional capacity
and can thus be prevented when the relevant-task process-
ing involves sufﬁcient high perceptual load to engage full
attentional capacity.
Evidence in support of this claim has been found in
many studies demonstrating that distractor processing isx: +44 20 74364276.
hie_forster@hotmail.
BY license.signiﬁcantly reduced with tasks of high (compared to
low) perceptual load (e.g., Lavie, 1995; Rees, Frith, & Lavie,
1997; see Lavie, 2005, for review). This conclusion has gen-
eralized across various manipulations of perceptual load
(that have either involved a greater number of items
requiring identiﬁcation in the high load conditions or a
greater complexity of the perceptual task, see Lavie,
2005, for review) and across various measures of distractor
processing. For example, perceptual load has been shown
to reduce (and indeed typically eliminate) distractor inter-
ference effects measured with response competition
(Lavie, 1995; Lavie & Cox, 1997; Lavie, Ro, & Russell,
2003) and negative priming (Lavie & Fox, 2000). Perceptual
load has also been shown to modulate brain activity re-
lated to distractors whether these are visible (Rees et al.,
1997; Schwartz et al., 2005; Yi, Woodman, Widders,
Marois, & Chun, 2004) or even invisible (Bahrami, Lavie,
and Rees, 2007).
Recent studies have demonstrated that perceptual load
effects can overcome individual differences in distractibil-
ity (Forster & Lavie, 2007) and can also eliminate the ef-
fects of highly salient distractors that, like many daily
life distractors, cause interference despite bearing no rela-
tionship to the task currently being performed (Forster &
1 Note that we restrict our review only to manipulations that produced
signiﬁcant effects on the level of TUT reported.
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life sources of distraction may not only be found in the
external environment, but also in the form of internally
generated distractions such as task-unrelated thoughts
(TUTs). For example, a person may be distracted from
reading this article by the intrusion of a thought about
an unrelated issue - perhaps some salient recent event
in his or her daily life. The purpose of this paper is to clar-
ify whether the established role of perceptual load in
determining task-irrelevant processing would also apply
to internal sources of potential distraction, such as dis-
traction by TUTs.
We reasoned that, similarly to the role of load in pro-
cessing task-irrelevant information from external sources,
the processing of task-irrelevant information from internal
sources such as mind-wandering may also be determined
by perceptual load. The load research we previously men-
tion has established that processing of task-irrelevant
stimuli with very different contents (e.g., verbal vs. visual
and complex stimuli such as words or visual scenes vs.
simple stimuli such as letters or contrast and motion,
Brand-D’Abrescia & Lavie, 2007; Lavie, 2006; Macdonald
& Lavie, 2008; Rees et al., 1997; Schwartz et al., 2005)
and sources (e.g., different sensory modalities, conscious
as well as unconscious processes, e.g., (Bahrami, Carmel,
Walsh, Rees, & Lavie, 2008; Cartwright-Finch & Lavie,
2006; Dalton, Lavie, and Spence, 2008; Macdonald & Lavie,
2008) is modulated by the level of load in the task-relevant
processing. These ﬁndings provide support for the Load
Theory claim that the processing of any task-irrelevant
information (be it verbal or visual, simple or complex, con-
scious or unconscious, in one sensory modality or another,
and so forth) requires limited-capacity attention and can
therefore occur only when the processing of task-relevant
information leaves some spare attentional capacity (under
conditions of low perceptual load). We thus reasoned that
higher perceptual load that would engage more attentional
capacity in the processing of task-relevant information
may reduce the processing of task-irrelevant information
not only from external sources (e.g., visual distractors)
but also from internal sources (e.g., mind-wandering) in
the present study.
1.1. Mind-wandering measures and previous ﬁndings
In comparison to the extensive body of research exam-
ining the attention principles that govern distraction by
external stimuli, the topic of attention and distraction by
mind-wandering has been relatively understudied, per-
haps due to lack of any truly objective method for directly
measuring the occurrence of such a highly subjective phe-
nomenon. However, laboratory measures of mind-wander-
ing have been developed (e.g., measuring TUT occurrence
with probe-caught methods, whereby on the appearance
of a probe the subject has to report whether or not they
had just experienced TUT), and studies using these
methods suggest that mind-wandering is a ubiquitous
and potent source of distraction: TUTs often occur uninten-
tionally and interfere with performance on a range of tasks
from signal detection tasks to encoding and reading tasks
(Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 2004; Segal & Fusella,1970; Smallwood, Baracaia, Lowe, & Obonsawin, 2003;
Smallwood, O’Connor, Sudberry, Haskell, & Ballantyne,
2004; Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007; see also
Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Smallwood, Fishman, &
Schooler, 2007 for review).
Despite these apparent distracting effects of mind-wan-
dering, however, no study as yet has demonstrated any
causal role for focused attention in determining levels of
TUT. A number of studies have directly manipulated task
factors that were found to decrease the level of task-unre-
lated thoughts,1 but none has yet used an established
manipulation of focused attention. Moreover, in almost all
cases these manipulations are likely to have interfered di-
rectly with the very ability to produce or maintain a thought.
Thus the role of focused attention in TUTs (or mind-wander-
ing) remains unclear.
For example, it has been shown that working memory
load can reduce TUT (Teasdale et al, 1995; Teasdale,
Proctor, Lloyd, & Baddeley, 1993), yet working memory is
clearly needed in order to provide a mental work space
for thought (for example one would need to maintain the
start of the thought in order to develop its semantics in a
coherent manner in which the end relates to the start,
see Baddeley (1986)). It has also been shown that perform-
ing a task relative to no task at all or increasing stimulus
presentation rates can reduce the rates of TUT reports
(e.g., Giambra, 1995; McKiernan, D’Angelo, Kaufman, &
Binder, 2006). However, not only do conditions of task per-
formance (compared to no task performance) and faster
(vs. slower) presentation rates involve a higher working
memory load, but they also involve increased demands
on responses (as with higher presentation rate the re-
sponse rate is also higher). The simple act of making a re-
sponse has been shown to directly interfere with the rate
of TUT reports (e.g., see Antrobus (1968)). By contrast, here
we ask whether it is possible to reduce task-unrelated
thoughts by engaging more attentional capacity in a task
with high (compared to low) perceptual load, without di-
rectly drawing on thought or response components that
are clearly part and parcel of the production or report of
any thought.
The suggestion of a recent review of the mind-wander-
ing literature that the rate of TUTs reported is higher in
tasks that require only ‘‘superﬁcial engagement” compared
to those that require moderate or deeper levels of engage-
ment (Smallwood, Fishman et al., 2007) is encouraging for
our present load hypothesis. However, the broad term
‘‘task-engagement” may encompass a number of factors
in addition to attention (e.g., changes in the overall level
of motivation, interest and arousal, as well as the engage-
ment of processes such as working memory and thought)
and the tasks presumed in the review to involve differing
levels of task engagement (e.g., signal detection tasks were
assumed to involve superﬁcial engagement, whereas read-
ing tasks were assumed to always involve deep engage-
ment) also differed in terms of many of these factors.
Therefore any variation in the rate of TUTs reported during
2 Note that the effects of perceptual load have previously been demon-
strated using both manipulations of set size and manipulations of the
complexity of processing demands (e.g., see Lavie (1995) for review see
Lavie (2005)). We have chosen to use the search set size manipulation for
this study as this manipulation has been shown not to interfere with
working memory task performance, as discussed above.
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the level of attentional engagement, rather than to these
other factors.
Recent ﬁndings of an association between the speeding
of responses in a go/no go task (which may reﬂect less
careful task-performance stemming from reduced task-
engagement) and a higher rate of TUT reports (Smallwood
et al., 2004; Smallwood, McSpadden et al., 2007) also pro-
vide some suggestive evidence that the level of attentional
engagement in a task may determine TUT. However,
changes in the speed of responses may be driven by a num-
ber of factors other than attentional engagement in the
task (e.g., practice, arousal, motivation). Furthermore, in
the absence of any manipulation of attention it is impossi-
ble to determine whether it was the speeding of responses
(and putative task-disengagement it reﬂects) that led to a
higher rate of TUT or whether the occurrence of TUT led
to the putative attention disengagement and hence the
speeding of the task responses.
The present study is thus the ﬁrst to examine whether
focused attention plays a causal role in determining
mind-wandering, by directly manipulating the level of de-
mand on attentional capacity (through our manipulation of
perceptual load) in visual search: a paradigmatic and
widely used attention task.
Finally, it is important to note that some effects of a sec-
ondary task or working memory load on mind-wandering
have previously been interpreted as indicating that mind-
wandering draws on central executive resources (e.g.,
Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Teasdale et al., 1995) and
in some cases these have been referred to as ‘‘executive
attention” (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). However recent
advances in attention research demonstrate that ‘atten-
tion’ cannot be used as an umbrella term encompassing
all limited-capacity processes, instead it is important to
distinguish between the effects on focused attention of
capacity limits in perception vs. in executive control pro-
cesses. Whereas exhausting perceptual capacity in tasks
of high perceptual load reduces distractor processing and
thus improves focused attention, load on executive control
processes such as working memory during selective atten-
tion tasks has the opposite effect of increasing rather than
decreasing distractor processing. Since load on working
memory reduces its availability to actively maintain fo-
cused attention in line with current stimulus processing
priorities the irrelevant distractor stimuli gain more pro-
cessing access (e.g., De Fockert, Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2001;
Lavie, 2000; Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004).
We consider the implications of this dissociation for
mind-wandering later (in the General Discussion). For
now we note that in the present study, given our focus
on perceptual load rather than executive control, our
manipulation of perceptual load was designed to minimize
any confounding involvement of higher levels of executive
control resources with the increase in perceptual load.
To this end we incorporated thought probes into a typ-
ical perceptual load paradigm involving a visual search
task in which the number of search non-targets was varied
(from one to six items) to produce high or low perceptual
load (e.g., Lavie, 1995; Lavie, 2005; Lavie & Cox, 1997).
The manipulation of perceptual load through the numberof search non-targets2 (often termed ‘‘set size”) is very well
established (see Lavie (2005) for review) and has been
shown to reduce distractor perception and related activity
in the visual cortex in many previous studies (see
Macdonald and Lavie (2008) for a recent demonstration
and review).
Notice in particular that the controlled aspects of the
task (e.g., maintaining the target template in working
memory) remain constant across the levels of perceptual
load, only the number of search items is varied. As such,
this increase in the number of items places demands on
perceptual search processes (e.g., serial spatial scanning
of a greater number of search items, see Treisman (1988),
Treisman and Gelade (1980)) rather than control pro-
cesses. Indeed, previous research has indicated that
increasing perceptual load in this task does not interfere
with working memory task performance, nor does it inter-
act with the effects of working memory load on distraction
(e.g., Lavie et al., 2004; Logan, 1978). Thus, any effects of
perceptual load on TUT in this task are unlikely to reﬂect
direct interference with thought components, or with their
executive control (e.g., by blocking working memory).
2. Experiment 1
In Experiments 1a and 1b participants performed a let-
ter search task with high and low perceptual load, during
which they responded to thought probes. In the original
perceptual load paradigm on which our task is based (Lavie
& Cox, 1997) feedback was given for errors in the form of a
brief ‘‘beep” tone. As the error rate is typically higher in the
high load condition this means that the high load condition
would be associated with more frequent feedback tones. It
was therefore important to establish that any reduction in
the level of TUT reports under high perceptual load did not
simply reﬂect an effect of the greater number of feedback
tones in this condition. For example, as abrupt onsets have
been shown to capture attention during the performance
of an external task (e.g., see Jonides and Yantis (1988),
Yantis and Jonides (1984)), the greater number of abrupt
sound onsets in the high load condition might capture
attention towards the external environment and task and
therefore away from any task-unrelated thoughts. In addi-
tion, the higher level of feedback may have increased moti-
vation to remain on task in the high (compared to low)
load condition. Indeed feedback tones can be used to im-
prove participants’ ability to maintain sustained attention
to a task (e.g., Manly et al., 2004). For this reason, we ran
two versions of Experiment 1, with and without the error
feedback. Participants in Experiment 1a were presented
with error feedback, but those in Experiment 1b were gi-
ven feedback only during the practice trials and not during
the main task performance.
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2.1.1. Participants
All participants in the reported experiments were vol-
unteers recruited from University College London subject
pool and had normal or corrected to normal vision. Ten
participants (three males, 20–35 years old) participated
in Experiment 1a. Fourteen participants (three males, 8–
35 years old) participated in Experiment 1b. The data from
one additional participant in Experiment 1b was not in-
cluded in the analysis as this participant performed at
chance level on the task.
2.1.2. Stimuli and procedure
E-Prime was used to program and run the experiment.
All stimuli were presented in white on a black background,
on a 15 in. monitor and at a viewing distance of approxi-
mately 60 cm. Each trial in the visual search task began
with 500 ms black screen interval, followed by a ﬁxation
point presented for 500 ms in the centre of the screen. This
was followed immediately by the stimulus display, con-
sisting of six letters arranged to form a circle (with the ra-
dius subtending 1.6 degrees of visual angle), presented for
100 ms. Participants were required to search the display
for a target letter (either X or N, subtending 0.6  0.4)
and respond using the numerical keypad by pressing the
0 key if the target was an X and the 2 key if the target
was an N. In Experiment 1a, a 90 ms beep sounded on
incorrect responses or if the participant failed to respond
within a 3000 ms time window. In Experiment 1b, partici-
pants were given this same feedback during the practice
trials, but were given no feedback during the main exper-
imental trials. In the low load condition the ﬁve non-target
letters were all small Os (subtending 0.15), whereas in the
high load the non-target letters were heterogeneous angu-
lar letters (selected at random from H, K, M, Z, W, V). All
combinations of target identity and position were fully
counterbalanced.
Participants performed 3 slower low and high load
example trials before receiving deﬁnitions and examples
of task-related and task-unrelated thoughts. Task related
thoughts were deﬁned as being thoughts about any aspect
of the task being performed at that moment, with exam-
ples being ‘‘where is the target letter?” or ‘‘oops, I’ve
pressed the wrong button”. Task-unrelated thoughts were
deﬁned as being thoughts about anything other than the
task being performed, with examples being ‘‘my lecture
this morning was boring.” or ‘‘I must stop by the supermar-
ket on the way home.” Participants then completed twelve
practice trials of each level of load with a practice thought
probe after each set of twelve trials. The thought probe
consisted of the question ‘‘What were you thinking just
now?”. Participants were instructed to report the thought
that had been passing through their mind in the moment
just before the probe appeared. Onscreen instructions
asked the participant to press A if they were thinking about
the task that they were performing, and to press Z if they
were thinking about something unrelated to the immedi-
ate task. Participants were told that during the letter task
they should keep their ﬁngers ready on the relevant keys
and try to focus on the task in order to respond as fast aspossible while also maintaining a high level of accuracy.
They were told that there would be no need to prepare
for the thought probes (e.g., by keeping their ﬁngers on
the response keys) before they appear on screen, as
instructions for the responses to the thought probes would
be presented with each probe. They were also reassured
that there was no right or wrong answer to the probe ques-
tion and that their probe responses were not being timed,
so they should therefore simply respond honestly to the
question. Participants then completed eight high load and
eight low load blocks of 48 trials in the order ABBAABBA-
ABBAABBA (counterbalanced between participants), with
a thought probe presented at the end of each block.
2.2. Results and discussion
All RT analyses in the experiments reported here were
conducted only on trials to which a correct response was
made. Analyses of RTs and percentage error (PE) rates in
the high and low load conditions replicated previous ﬁnd-
ings (e.g., Lavie & Cox, 1997), conﬁrming that the increase
in the relevant search set size (through the number of
angular letters) was effective in increasing load. Partici-
pants’ RTs were signiﬁcantly longer under high load (for
Experiment 1a M = 644 ms; for Experiment 1b M =
706 ms) than under low load (for Experiment 1a M =
486 ms; for Experiment 1b M = 490 ms, t (9) = 14.11,
SEM = 11.20, p < .001, d = 9.41 for the difference in Experi-
ment 1a; t (13) = 11, SEM = 19.66, p < .001, d = 6.10 for the
difference in Experiment 1b).
The high load condition was also associated with a sig-
niﬁcantly higher PE rate (for Experiment 1a, M = 16.4%; for
Experiment 1b, M = 9.9%) than the low load condition (for
Experiment 1a, M = 7.2%, for Experiment 1b, M = 4.7%), t
(9) = 5.18, SEM = 1.78, p = .001, d = 3.45 for the difference
in Experiment 1a; t (13) = 4.99, SEM = 1.03, p < .001,
d = 2.77 for the difference in Experiment 1b.
Across the load conditions, the percentage of thought
probes to which a TUT was reported varied between 25%
and 88% (M = 52.63%, S.D. = 16.19). Importantly, paired t-
tests conﬁrmed our main prediction that perceptual load
would reduce TUTs: As can be seen in Fig. 1, the percentage
of TUTs reported was signiﬁcantly reduced in the high load
condition (for Experiment 1a, M = 48.9%, for Experiment
1b, M = 44%), compared to the low load condition (for
Experiment 1a, M = 61.6%, for Experiment 1b, M = 57.5%),
t (9) = 2.40, SEM = 5.29, p = .04, d = 1.60 for the difference
in Experiment 1a, t (13) = 2.16, SEM = 6.24, p = .05,
d = 1.20 for the difference in Experiment 1b. Clearly then,
Experiment 1b establishes that the load effects on TUT per-
sist in the absence of any feedback and so cannot be attrib-
uted to the greater likelihood of error feedback in the high
(compared to low) load condition.
A mixed model ANOVA with the between-subject fac-
tors of experiment (Experiments 1a and 1b) and the with-
in-subject factor of load (low, high) revealed that the
somewhat surprising numerical trend for an increase
(rather than decrease) in the rate of TUT reports in Exper-
iment 1a (M = 55.25%) compared with Experiment 1b
(M = 50.75%) was not signiﬁcant and neither was the inter-
action of experiment and load (both Fs < 1). The ﬁnding
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Fig. 1. Percentage of probes at which a task-unrelated thought (TUT) was reported under high and low perceptual load in Experiments 1–3.
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ence of feedback (in Experiment 1a) does not rule out the
possibility that feedback can reduce TUT reports when
subjects are explicitly instructed to use the feedback as a
reminder to stay on task (cf. Manly et al., 2004). However,
by demonstrating clear effects of load on TUT in paradigms
both with and without feedback we have ruled out the any
alternative interpretation of these load effects as being dri-
ven by the greater levels of feedback in the high load
condition.
In addition, we note that, as each trial was triggered by
the response to the previous trial, the greater RTs in the
high load condition would have also resulted in a slower
stimulus presentation rate in this condition. However, as
previous studies (e.g., Antrobus, 1968; Giambra, 1995)
have consistently reported increases in TUT as stimulus
presentation rate decreases, our ﬁnding of a decrease in
TUT reports under high load cannot be accounted for by
the slower stimulus presentation rate in this condition.
Thus, Experiment 1 establishes that perceptual load, al-
ready known to be a powerful determinant of the process-
ing of task-unrelated stimuli in the external world, may
also determine the level of internal distractors in the form
of task-unrelated thoughts. As no error feedback was given
in Experiment 1b, these effects cannot be attributed to any
effect of feedback (e.g., in capturing attention towards the
task or in increasing the overall level of motivation in the
high load compared to the low load condition).
3. Experiment 2
In Experiment 2 we sought to rule out any component
of verbal working memory load in our task. As we used let-
ters as search stimuli in Experiment 1 it could be argued
that, in addition to increased perceptual demands, the ver-
bal working memory demands in the high load condition
(in which participants were required to discriminate the
target letter from amongst ﬁve different non-target letters)
were also greater than those in the low load condition (in
which the ﬁve non-target letters were all Os and therefore
only two letters could potentially be verbalized). The re-
duced level of TUTs under high load therefore could have
simply reﬂected the suppression of verbal TUTs by partic-
ipants’ internal verbalization of the larger letter searchset under high load. To rule out this possibility, in Experi-
ment 2 we used Hebrew letters for the search stimuli
and recruited English participants who were unfamiliar
with Hebrew, so that our search stimuli now appeared as
meaningless shapes in both of the low and high load
conditions.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Twelve new participants (two males, 8–23 years old)
participated in Experiment 2. None of the subjects were
able to read Hebrew or name any Hebrew letters.
3.1.2. Stimuli and procedure
All stimuli and procedure were identical to those used
in Experiment 1a, with the exception that Hebrew letters
were used in place of the search letters of the previous
experiments (see Fig. 2 for an example stimulus display).
The target letters were ‘ ’ (mapped to the response key 2)
and ‘ ’ (mapped to the response key 0). In the low load con-
dition the non-targets were all small dots (subtending
0.2  0.2). In the high load condition three Hebrew
non-target letters, selected at random from the set , , ,
were presented with equal likelihood in three of the ﬁve
positions not occupied by the target, with the remaining
two positions occupied by small dots. All letters subtended
between 0.6 and 0.9 vertically by 0.4 horizontally and
were presented in gray for 100 ms exposure duration as
before.
A set size of four was used in the high load condition
as pilot testing had indicated that, using the Hebrew
stimuli with non-Hebrew speaking participants, this set
size was sufﬁcient to induce an increase in RTs and error
rate of a similar magnitude to that associated with the
increase in load in Experiment 1. In addition, in order
to ensure that the high load condition did not involve
a greater verbal processing load than the low load condi-
tion (due to any verbal processing of the added non-tar-
get symbols) we asked three independent judges to
complete the eight high load blocks used in the actual
experiment (following the same experimental procedure)
and, immediately following the ﬁnal trial, to answer the
following questions:
Fig. 2. Example stimulus displays with low and high perceptual load in Experiment 2.
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bal names to any of the symbols that you saw on
screen? If so please could you write these down on
the sheet of paper beside you, and also indicate whether
these were target symbols or non-target symbols.
2. Did you, at any point in the experiment, have verbal
thoughts relating to speciﬁc symbols? If so please could
you write them down, indicating whether each thought
was about a target or non-target symbol.
Although two out of the three judges indicated that
they had assigned a verbal label to one of the two target
symbols (‘‘shoe” or ‘‘boot”), none of the judges had as-
signed any verbal names or reported any verbal thought
associated with the non-target symbols. Note that any ver-
bal demands associated with the target letters remained
constant across the two load conditions.
3.2. Results
As in Experiment 1, the RT and error data showed the
expected effects of perceptual load. RTs under high load
were signiﬁcantly longer (M = 719 ms) than under low load
(M = 547 ms), t (11) = 7.87, SEM = 21.89, p < .001, d = 4.75
for the difference. The PE rate was also signiﬁcantly higher
under high load (M = 10.25%) than under low load
(M = 6.41%), t (11) = 2.34, SEM = 1.64, p = .039, d = 1.41 for
the difference.
The key ﬁnding of this experiment was that the partic-
ipants again reported less TUTs in the high perceptual load
condition (M = 53.15%), compared to low load condition
(M = 65.62%), t (11) = 2.43, SEM = 5.10, p = .033, d = 1.47
for the difference (see Fig. 1). Thus, Experiment 2 estab-
lishes that the effect of perceptual load on the rate of
TUT reports does not require the use of familiar verbal
material that could serve to load verbal working memory
and thus directly block the mental workspace for thought.
4. Experiment 3
In Experiment 3 we examined whether the reduction in
the rate of TUTs reported under high perceptual load re-ﬂects an effect of load on deliberate TUTs or on uninten-
tional TUTs. Previous perceptual load research suggests
that the effects of perceptual load would not be conﬁned
just to deliberate TUTs: Increasing perceptual load has pre-
viously been found to eliminate interference even from po-
tent task-irrelevant distractors that interfere with task
performance in conditions of low perceptual load despite
participants’ attempts to ignore them (e.g., Forster & Lavie,
2008a; Lavie, 1995) This leads us to predict that high per-
ceptual load would be capable of reducing the rate of unin-
tentional intrusions by TUTs. Alternatively, however, one
might argue that for internal sources of irrelevant distrac-
tion high perceptual load could merely reduce the deliber-
ate intention to engage in TUT (for example, because the
high load task may be less boring) but would have no effect
on those TUTs that intrude into the mind unintentionally.
To examine this issue, in Experiment 3 participants were
probed as to whether any task-unrelated thought they
may have had was deliberate or unintentional.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
Eighteen new participants (ﬁve males, 18–33 years old)
participated in Experiment 3.
4.1.2. Stimuli and procedure
The stimuli and procedure were the same as those used
in Experiment 1a, with the exception that following the re-
sponse to the thought probe the participants were pre-
sented with an additional probe asking them to indicate
whether the reported TUT was deliberate or unintentional
by pressing either the X or C keys respectively (or by press-
ing the A key if no TUT was reported). The following expla-
nation of deliberate and accidental TUTs was given to the
participants before they started the experiment: ‘‘Some-
times people may, for one reason or another, deliberately
allow their mind to wander from a task that they are per-
forming. This is a deliberate TUT. Other times a person may
be really trying to concentrate on a task but somehow acci-
dentally their mind wanders off to think about something
else, unrelated to the task. This is an unintentional or acci-
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right or wrong response to this question and that they
should simply be honest.
4.2. Results
As in the previous experiments, RT and PE data showed
the expected effects of perceptual load. RTs were longer in
the high load condition (M = 679 ms) compared to the low
load condition (M = 516 ms), t (17) = 14.07, SEM = 11.95,
p < .001, d = 6.82 for the difference. PE rates were also sig-
niﬁcantly higher in the high load condition (M = 10.17%),
compared to the low load condition (M = 4.61%), t
(17) = 5.76, SEM = 0.97, p < .001, d = 2.79 for the difference.
The TUT reports were entered into a within-subject AN-
OVA with the factors of perceptual load (low, high) and
intention (deliberate, unintentional). As can be seen in
Fig. 3, the ANOVA showed a main effect of perceptual load
that replicated the results of previous experiments: The
rate of TUTs reported under low perceptual load
(M = 60.06%) was signiﬁcantly reduced under high percep-
tual load (M = 44.87%), F (17) = 13.05, MSE = 81.65,
p = .002, g2p = .356. There was also a main effect of inten-
tion: unintentional TUTs were reported on a signiﬁcantly
greater percentage of trials (M = 38.28%) than deliberate
TUTs (M = 13.89%), F (17) = 9.41, MSE = 1083.95, p = .007,
g2p = .434. The interaction between load and intention was
not signiﬁcant, F (17) = 2.33, MSE = 222.20, p = .145,
g2p = .120. However, the low rate of deliberate TUTs found
in this experiment makes this measure insensitive to show
any effect or interaction. For this reason we conﬁne our
conclusion to the unintentional TUTs only. With respect
to these, the results of Experiment 3 clearly show that high
perceptual load can reduce intrusions by unintentional
task-irrelevant thoughts. This ﬁnding has important impli-
cations both for predicting the ability to pay attention to a
task with minimal distraction by unintentional TUTs in
daily life and for clinical populations (e.g., ADHD). We dis-
cuss these in greater detail in Section 6.Low load
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Experiment 3.5. Experiment 4
Having established the effects of perceptual load on
mind-wandering, in Experiment 4 we sought to relate the
effects of perceptual load on the processing of task-irrele-
vant and potentially distracting information from internal
and external sources. We thus included external task-irrel-
evant distractors, adding ﬂanker letters that could be
incongruent or congruent with the target to the paradigm
used in Experiments 1–3, and assessed the effects of per-
ceptual load on both the internal (rates of TUT) and exter-
nal (response-competition effects) forms of potential
distraction.
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Participants
Twenty new participants (six males, 19–30 years old)
participated in Experiment 4.
5.1.2. Stimuli and procedure
All stimuli and procedure were the same as in Experi-
ment 1a, with the exception that the distractor letters X
or N, each subtending 0.8  0.5, were presented to the
left or the right of the letter circle (1.4 from the nearest
circle letter). All combinations of distractor position, dis-
tractor identity, target position and target identity and load
were fully counterbalanced.
5.2. Results
Table 1 presents the results. A 2  2 within-subjects
ANOVA of the mean RT with the factors of distractor con-
gruency and load revealed main effects of load, F (1,
19) = 82.56, MSE = 10140.6, p < .001, g2p = .813, and distrac-
tor congruency, F (1, 19) = 16.11, MSE = 539.30, p = .000,
g2p = .449. Of most importance was the interaction between
load and distractor congruency, F (1, 19) = 17.655,
MSE = 319.6, p < .001, g2p = .482, indicating that the distrac-Unintentional
ted thoughts (TUT) were reported under high and low perceptual load in
Table 1
Experiment 4: Mean RTs (SE in parentheses) and percentage error rates as a
function of distractor conditions and load, and mean percentage of task-
unrelated thoughts (TUTs) as a function of load.
Low load High load
I
RT (ms) 605 (29) 793 (36)
% Error 7 17
C
RT (ms) 567 (24) 789 (36)
% Error 4 16
TUTs 41.25% 51.90%
Note. I = incongruent distractor, C = congruent distractor.
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effect M = 38 ms, t (19) = 5.13, SEM = 7.33, p < .001,
d = 2.35) was signiﬁcantly reduced with high load (distrac-
tor effect M = 4 ms, t < 1). These results replicate previous
ﬁndings (e.g., Lavie & Cox, 1997), demonstrating a signiﬁ-
cant reduction in interference from external distractors
under high perceptual load.
A 2  2 ANOVA on the PE rates also revealed main ef-
fects of load, F (1, 19) = 50.61, MSE = 46.73, p < .001,
g2p = .727, and distractor congruency, F (1, 19) = 32.90,
MSE = 2.88, g2p = .634, p < .001. Although the load  con-
gruency interaction was not signiﬁcant, F (1, 19) = 1.30,
MSE = 8.09, p = .269, g2p = .064, the numerical trends seen
in Table 1 were in the same direction as the RT.
As in Experiments 1–3, high perceptual load has also
signiﬁcantly reduced the rate of TUTs reported in this
experiment (for the high load M = 41.25%, for low load
M = 51.90%), t (19) = 3.43, SEM = 3.10, p = .003, d = 1.57
for the difference. Furthermore, there was a signiﬁcant cor-
relation between the effect of perceptual load on TUTs and
on the distractor response-competition effects both when
these were calculated as the mean I–C under each level
of load, Pearson r (20) = .489, p = .029, and when individual
differences in the baseline RT were accounted for by com-
puting the percentage RT increase in the incongruent (vs.
congruent) distractor conditions under the different levels-5%
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Fig. 4. Correlation between load effects on internal distractors (TUT reports) an
effects were calculated as the percentage increase in RTs on incongruent trials cof load, Pearson r (20) = .571, p = .009 (see Fig. 4). This cor-
relation was not due to variations in the extent to which
load has increased the demand of the search task as it re-
mained signiﬁcant when individual variations in the mag-
nitude of the main effect of load on RTs were partialed out,
r (17) = .491, p = .033 (for the same correlation with dis-
tractor response-competition effects calculated as percent-
ages r = .599, p = .007).
The clear relationship between the magnitude of the
load effects on internal (TUTs) and external (response com-
petition) distractors across individuals suggests that these
decreases in both internal and external distractors reﬂect
one underlying focused attention ability driven by the level
of perceptual load in the task.
Notice that the ﬁnding of a correlation between individ-
ual differences in the magnitude of the effect of perceptual
load on internal and external distractors does not contra-
dict previous load research by suggesting that perceptual
load is less effective in reducing interference by external
distractors for some individuals: Consistent with previous
studies (e.g., Forster & Lavie, 2007), high perceptual load
also eliminated distractor response-competition effects
for all subjects in the present study (see Table 1), but the
correlation indicates that perceptual load was most effec-
tive in reducing not only distractor effects but also TUTs
for those individuals with the greatest levels of distractor
effects in the conditions of low perceptual load.
6. General discussion
The present experiments establish that, like task-irrele-
vant external distractors, internal sources of distraction in
the form of task-unrelated thoughts can also be modulated
by the level of perceptual load in the task performed. This
ﬁnding implies that, despite the obvious differences be-
tween TUTs and external distractors (e.g., TUTs are inter-
nally generated and may be drawn from long term
memory processes, see Christoff, Ream, and Gabrieli
(2004)), the process of the distraction of attention by
task-irrelevant stimuli may involve common mechanismsTUT low - high load)
40%30%20%%
d external (response competition) distractors. Response-competition (RC)
ompared to congruent trials.
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experiments further clarify that the reduction in the level
of TUTs reported under high perceptual load is not simply
due to a change in the demands on verbal working mem-
ory (Experiment 2), rate of responses and response feed-
back or the level of motivation (Experiment 1) or
deliberate intention to engage in TUTs (Experiment 3).
As we have ruled out any alternative account for the ef-
fects of perceptual load in terms of a change in the extent
to which the visual search task directly recruits compo-
nents that are needed either for the actual production or
the report of any thought (e.g., working memory, cf.
Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Teasdale et al., 1995), these
results suggest the sharing of a central perceptual process-
ing resource (attention) between task-unrelated thoughts
and the high load search task in the manner predicted by
the Load Theory. Notice that in this respect the effects of
perceptual load demonstrated here are rather different to
the effects of other task manipulations that have been pre-
viously found to reduce TUT reports. As we discuss earlier
(in the General Introduction) the previous task manipula-
tions shown to reduce TUT reports (dual task vs single task
conditions, fast vs. slow stimulus presentation rates or
conditions of high vs low working memory load) have di-
rectly drawn on either thought or response components.
The reduction in TUT reports in those cases may therefore
be due to direct interference with thoughts or the pro-
cesses involved in reporting thoughts rather than to the
enhanced focusing of attention on the task.
The correlation between the effects of perceptual load
on TUTs and distractor response-competition effects
(Experiment 4) further demonstrates the role of a common
focused attention mechanism (driven by the level of per-
ceptual load in the task) in determining the levels of both
internal and external distractor interference. The present
ﬁndings therefore demonstrate that the Load Theory of
attention can be generalized to determine another potent
form of distraction due to mind-wandering.
Our use of a probe-caught method that did not require
the participants to continuously monitor for the occur-
rence of a task-unrelated thought, instead asking the sub-
jects to report what they were thinking ‘‘just now”,
makes it unlikely that the results could be attributed to
alternative accounts in terms of load effects on either
meta-awareness of thoughts (see Smallwood and Schooler
(2006)) or on the encoding of thoughts into memory. As
our self-report measure did require participants to be suf-
ﬁciently conscious of their thoughts to be able to report
them, however, it remains possible that the effects of load
are restricted to conscious task-unrelated thoughts but
that unconscious thought processes are unaffected by load.
Interestingly, a recent study demonstrates that percep-
tual load can modulate unconscious processing of external
task-irrelevant stimuli. Bahrami et al. (2008) examined tilt
after effects following adaptation to oriented gratings that
were rendered invisible during adaptation with continuous
ﬂash suppression. Participants performed either a high or a
low perceptual load task at ﬁxation during adaptation to
the invisible oriented gratings and showed reduced tilt after
effects following thehigh compared to low load task, despite
having no conscious perception of the gratings. It wouldtherefore be an interesting avenue for future research to
examine whether the effects of perceptual load on task-
unrelated thoughts extend to unconscious thoughts.
As the ﬁrst study of mind-wandering to directly manip-
ulate task demands on attentional capacity, our conclusion
that perceptual load plays a causal role in determining
mind-wandering can both accommodate previous sugges-
tions and guide future frameworks of mind-wandering. For
example, it has been recently suggested that mind-wan-
dering depends on the extent to which a task demands
engagement with the external environment, and that the
smaller rate of TUTs found in some studies using reading
tasks compared to other studies that have used signal
detection tasks is due to the greater level of task engage-
ment in reading vs. signal detection tasks (Smallwood,
Fishman et al., 2007).
Our present application of Load Theory to mind-wan-
dering can clarify the concept of task engagement by sug-
gesting that the level of task engagement would depend on
the level of perceptual load in the task. Notice that this pro-
posal does not rely on a taxonomy of tasks that are sup-
posed to always demand greater or lesser levels of
engagement. Instead we propose that any type of task
may be prone to more or less TUT depending on the level
of perceptual load it involves. For instance a signal detec-
tion task conducted under conditions of high perceptual
load would be predicted to be less prone to mind-wander-
ing than either the same task with low perceptual load or a
reading task of a low perceptual load (e.g., repeated read-
ing of the same words).
In this way, Load Theory offers a theoretical framework
for determining levels of task-engagement and (con-
versely) task-unrelated thought. A fruitful direction for fu-
ture research would be to explore this suggestion by
measuring TUT whilst employing a previously established
manipulation of perceptual load during a signal detection
task (e.g., see Macdonald & Lavie, 2008).
By demonstrating the effect of perceptual load on task-
unrelated thought, the present study represents a ﬁrst
stage in the application of load theory to internal distrac-
tors. Load theory makes a clear distinction between the ef-
fects of perceptual load and of executive control load on
distractor processing, Whereas high perceptual load re-
duces distractor processing, high levels of cognitive load
increase distraction due to reduced ability to suppress
irrelevant information (e.g., see Lavie et al. (2004)). With
respect to TUTs this would lead to an interesting counter-
intuitive prediction that high cognitive load would lead to
an increased rate of TUT. A major obstacle, however, to
testing this second prediction of load theory would be that,
as has been discussed above, various components of exec-
utive control appear likely to be involved in the production
of any thought (indeed it has been shown that increasing
working memory load decreases TUT, Teasdale et al.,
1993; Teasdale et al., 1995, presumably by directly inter-
fering with the production of thought).
Finally, by identifying perceptual load as means by
which to reduce levels of task-unrelated thoughts, the
present ﬁndings also suggest that perceptual load may be
useful in applied and clinical settings. As discussed above,
task-unrelated thoughts have been shown to interfere with
354 S. Forster, N. Lavie / Cognition 111 (2009) 345–355performance on a wide range of tasks – future research
should investigate the possibility that perceptual load
may protect against such interference by assessing the ef-
fect of TUTs on the performance of tasks modiﬁed to have
high and low perceptual load. Another important implica-
tion of these results would be that higher levels of percep-
tual load could temporarily alleviate the unusually high
levels of mind-wandering and task-unrelated thoughts
associated with ADHD (Shaw & Giambra, 1993) or the
intrusive task-unrelated thoughts associated with clinical
disorders such as post-traumatic stress disorder (e.g., see
Falsetti, Monnier, and Resnick (2005) and Obsessive Com-
pulsive Disorder (e.g., see Clark and O’Conner (2005)).
We are currently testing these hypotheses.
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